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Abstract 
 
Securing the HPC infrastructure is an important task. The level of awareness regarding the importance of this topic is 
high, but the level of investments and skills required to organise a proper protection make it a difficult task, with 
contrasted levels of solutions and practices observed. There are a huge number of security threats coming from both the 
Internet and internal networks and, despite the fact that it may seem as a high cost, it is crucial to introduce an adequate 
level of security to the infrastructure, because the costs of losing data are usually much higher.  
Based on a survey of the PRACE community, this paper describes security technologies used in data centres and 
especially its subset, i.e. HPC centres. It gives a set of general recommendations concerning how to enhance security of 
the HPC infrastructure. 
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Introduction 
IT security is a complex and multifaceted problem. The attack vectors may vary from a malicious employee trying to 
sabotage the network from the inside to a distributed denial of service attack coming from thousands, or even millions of 
hosts. Additionally, one of the best known IT security experts, Bruce Schneiera, once said that security is a process, not a 
product. It means that the HPC infrastructure will never be completely secure. It may be resilient to the known attacks at 
a given time but, since new attacks are being invented every day, its security level degrades with time, if not continuously 
improved. Fortunately new protection methods are invented, too.  
Due to the big number of resources each HPC centre has, they are interesting and tempting targets for the attackers.  
Breaking security of one of HPC centres gives the attacker a set of resources for further use. Moreover, numerous HPC 
centres participate in national and international initiatives (like PRACE) or projects that join parts of their infrastructures 
in dedicated networks, the internal traffic of which may be considered as more trusted than the traffic incoming from the 
Internet. Another factor that must be taken into account is the heterogeneity of the IT infrastructure of the HPC centres, 
especially those engaged with a significant number of R&D projects. They have different servers, clusters, services and 
applications. Using different technologies extends the attack vectors, complicates the securing and hardening process, 
and finally makes it much more difficult to secure and harden all systems. In addition, the used applications may often be 
immature (in the market sense), not created within a fully formal software development lifecycle and therefore contain 
more security bugs as well. 
A perfect solution for security problems obviously does not, and will never exist. One should not rely on security 
provided by a single product. The key to having an adequate level of security is called defence-in-depth. According to it, 
multiple layers of security controls are placed throughout the IT system. Even if one or two layers fail (e.g. a badly 
written Web application allows to perform an SQL injection attack and read sensitive data), other still exist and may stop 
the attack (e.g. an intrusion detection system recognizes changes in the common HTTP request pattern to the vulnerable 
URL and causes the blocking of the source IP address on the firewall). Defence-in-depth also does not guarantee the 
absolute security, but provides means to make a successful attack so difficult that it becomes cost-ineffective for the 
attacker.  
This White Paper presents the most important technologies used to secure the data centres (chapter 1), short information 
about a survey sent to PRACE partners (chapter 2) and general security recommendations (chapter 3) and sums-up the 
conclusions (chapter 4). The aspect of physical security of HPC data centres are outside the scope of this document.  
 
1. Technologies used to secure data centres 
1.1. Local network firewalls 
A firewall is the main solution for protection against network threats coming both from inside and outside of the HPC 
network.  In the easiest example it is a device installed on the network perimeter and examining the traffic between the 
internal and external networks. 
Guarding the entire network belongs to the tasks of the network firewall and therefore it is usually placed as close to the 
external network as possible. That prevents unnecessary network flow from occupying resources of LAN and therefore 
enhances performance. One can, however, imagine the severe consequences of a network firewall failure – no connection 
between the two sides of the firewall can be established. This is the reason to maintain a high availability (HA) feature. 
One of the easiest ways of achieving this is redundancy. Instead of having just one firewall guarding the network, it is a 
common practice to use two or more firewall devices cooperating with each other.  Redundancy may be additionally used 
together with load balancing (both firewalls work in parallel, each processing some part of the network traffic, and when 
one of them fails, the other starts to process the whole traffic volume) or not (normally only one of the firewalls processes 
the traffic while the other is inactive, starting its work only after the first fails). The load balancing approach may require 
a more sophisticated (and therefore more expensive) hardware. 
 
a
 http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html 
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It is advised to use not only the network firewalls but also support them with the local firewalls. Their task is to guard a 
single system and therefore they are placed, in contrast to network firewalls, as close as possible to the guarded system. 
That approach is consistent with the defence-in-depth principle. 
The simplest firewall is a packet filter. It operates on the network and transport ISO/OSI layers and has the knowledge 
about the source and destination of IP addresses and TCP/UDP ports. More advanced firewalls (beside the capability of 
packet filters) can also keep track of the state of network connections, i.e. perform stateful packet inspection. 
Application firewalls are the state-of-the-art among firewalls. They control all seven layers of the ISO/OSI model. Being 
able to inspect the application layer allows them to control applications or services specifically, which significantly 
enhances security. 
1.2. Antivirus software 
Security threats may also come in a form of malicious software (shortly: malware), such as software used by attackers to 
disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive information, or gain access to computer systems.  That group contains: 
computer viruses, adware, backdoors, malicious BHOs, dialers, fraudtools, hijackers, keyloggers, rootkits, spyware, 
Trojan horses, worms, etc. 
A software combating malware is popularly called anti-virus software, despite the fact that it detects and neutralizes all 
kinds of malicious software. Usually, it detects the malevolent software basing on signatures, i.e. known patterns of data 
within the executable code. It is therefore crucial to keep the signatures database up-to-date. However, it is possible for a 
computer to be infected with a new malware for which signatures are not known yet. To counter the so-called zero-day 
threats, heuristics can be used, based on differences in software behaviour patterns. This is a much more complicated (but 
also more powerful) approach and produces much more false positives. Real-time protection mode, as the name suggests, 
can also block malware threats in real-time. 
1.3. Local Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Prevention Systems  
Due to the fact that firewalls and antivirus systems are not sufficient to reliably secure the IT infrastructure and prevent 
attackers from gaining unauthorized access to companies’ internal networks, the implementation of additional security 
measures is necessary. One of the solutions that are designed to help and support Security Administrators are Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS). An IDS is dedicated to monitor critical parts of the infrastructure in order to discover intrusions 
and intrusion attempts and immediately inform administrators about it. To reduce the negative effects and minimize the 
impact of a successful breach it is crucial to minimize the window of opportunity when undergoing attacks are unnoticed. 
Therefore the aim of Intrusion Detection Systems is to discover and notify about attacks and intrusion attempts in near 
real-time.  
The two main categories of Intrusion Detection Systems are: 
• Host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) – an application installed on a specified machine. Its main goal is to 
monitor certain operating system components as well as applications and network interfaces in order to discover 
suspicious activity that may be a sign of a break-in attempt. 
• Network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) – monitors network traffic and attempts to discover known attack 
patterns (signature-based approach) or unusual network activity (anomaly detection approach).  
There are other IDS categories (for example Distributed Intrusion Detection System) and approaches to intrusion 
detection but most of them are based on the two main categories presented above. Intrusion Detection Systems with the 
active attack prevention mechanism and functionalities like blocking certain ports, resetting suspicious connection, etc. 
are called Intrusion Prevention Systems. 
1.4. Distributed Denial of Service protection 
A specific group of network attacks that is worth mentioning are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Their concept bases on 
rejecting a legitimate user access to a certain service. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a DoS attack that 
is additionally carried out from numerous different locations. It introduces two main factors: the attack volume is much 
higher and it is much more difficult (or even impossible) to define the list of attacking IP addresses.  
In the 1990s, conducting DDoS attacks required a broad technical knowledge plus much time and effort but this is no 
longer valid today mostly due to the wide availability of penetration test tools. The motivation has also changed: while 
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the first DDoS attacks were mostly a way of proving hacking skills or simply a proof of concept, today they have evolved 
and become actually a commercialized black market industry – a threat to be recognized in the future, especially when 
dealing with the SaaS marketing model. It is possible to purchase a certain DDoS attack period on the black market as for 
any other botnet-related activities, like sending SPAM. 
There are several types of DDoS attacks: from a very simple and outdated (as Ping of Death) to the more complex and 
sophisticated ones, which combine a number of attack methods and use amplification techniques. It is important to notice 
that although some attacks (e.g. flooding attacks) are technically simple, it certainly does not mean they are ineffective. 
Sometimes it is just the opposite – they are more dangerous than the complex ones. It is therefore important to develop 
and implement effective ways of dealing with them. 
Protecting against DDoS attacks is not an easy task. While a small scale attack can be mitigated by using software 
solutions such as precisely selected well adopted iptables rules or even dedicated hardware solutions (e.g. firewall with 
10Gb/s network interfaces) the problem becomes much more complex with the increase in attack volume. At first one 
needs to establish procedures specifying actions to be taken in case of detection of a DDoS attack. Only then technical 
solutions can be meaningful and effectively applied. Also, in case of attack one should involve the most powerful 
network devices in the defence actions in order to protect the internal infrastructure. The main target is to stop the attack 
at the network perimeter without wasting the internal network's resources. If it is impossible to stop it one should try to 
involve geographically distributed redundancy. HPCs could benefit from the fact that they are interconnected and 
geographically separated which can help to successfully defend their resources. 
1.5. Honeypots 
Knowing only that the attack happened often is not enough, one wants to know how exactly it proceeded. The technology 
which helps to achieve this is a honeypot. It is a trap set to detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts of 
unauthorized use of the system. It also allows gathering information about it for further analysis. Generally it consists of 
a host that appears to be part of a network, but is actually isolated and monitored. To attract the attackers it should also 
seem to contain valuable information or resources. 
1.6. Data Loss Prevention / Data Leakage Prevention software 
Information in an HPC centre is of great value (e.g. scientific results). Solutions for controlling the traffic looking for 
information leaks are therefore used more and more often. The mechanism performing such information leakage checks 
is a DLP (Data Loss Prevention / Data Leakage Prevention) system.  
DLP is the common name for a mechanism designed to control data transfers from a protected system to the external 
(public) one. It is especially dedicated to detect and, in some cases, prevent potential data leakage. There are various 
types of DLP systems. Some of them work on the server level and others on the network level. Network level DLPs are 
based on analysis of the data traffic: all data transferred through the DLP system are compared to the data patterns 
recorded in the DLP system to discover the sensitive data inside the transferred message. There are of course many 
potential actions to be taken by the DLP system, depending on the DLP design and its configuration. In the least 
restrictive configuration DLP can only record (e.g. to a log file) the fact of a sensitive data transfer attempt, in the most 
restrictive configuration the DLP can block the data transfer. Some other potential actions may be taken like notification 
to the data administrator about the sensitive data transfer, request of confirmation of the data transfer from the user who 
initiated the transfer or from the data administrator.  
One of the most important steps of setting up a DLP system is a process of defining sensitive data patterns. Some patterns 
can be very complicated and can depend on the specifics of the organization and its database content. Therefore it is very 
difficult to define a good pattern set. It should be defined very carefully, and well tested. Otherwise, a DLP system can 
produce many false positives and/or false negatives. The other important step is the placement of the DLP system in the 
network structure. It should be placed at a point where a risk of sensitive data transfer from the inside of the organization 
to the public network exists. Usually it is an internal network edge router or firewall. There are, of course, some 
techniques to cheat DLP systems by an experienced, malicious user. Most of them are based on cryptographic techniques, 
but on the other hand there are still some methods on the organizational or technical level to neutralize them. The DLP 
technology, however, should be currently considered as still relatively immature and therefore should not be treated as 
the main pillar of the data security but rather as an auxiliary solution. Some hardware vendors equip firewalls or security 
appliances with DLP modules that may be optionally activated.  
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1.7. Network segmentations – Demilitarized Zone, Virtual LANs 
Proper network segmentation must not be omitted. It is recommended to place public services in a separate network 
segment called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), without access to the internal LAN. It can be achieved by either physical 
separation or using VLANs (Virtual LANs), which enable the administrators to divide the physical network into logical 
sub-networks. Except the easier network segmentation VLANs help, for example, to separate the user traffic from the 
administration traffic, which obviously increases the overall security level. How the final configuration looks like it 
depends on the detailed requirements of the data centre’s services. 
1.8. Authentication 
Authentication based on a username and a static password is the most popular form of authenticating users. It is not, 
however, the most secure one. There are plenty of other, safer methods. The main idea of increasing authentication 
security is usually two-factor authentication. In that approach having a password, “something you know”, is not enough 
for a user to be authenticated. A second factor is required. Mostly it is the possession factor, “something you have”, like a 
private and public key.  
One of the relatively recent technologies that have been getting more attention lately is a one-time password method. 
OTP is a password that is valid for only one login session, which helps avoid some of the shortcoming of static 
passwords such as vulnerability to replay attacks, i.e. even if the attacker obtains the password, it is not valid and cannot 
be used anymore. It requires a special device to generate passwords, but the associated cost is not high. 
A better known technique is a use of asymmetric cryptography. A user needs a public and a private key for a successful 
authentication. The public key is placed on the server which authenticates the user before his/her first authentication. 
Then the user proves his or her identity by being able to decipher the challenge encrypted with his or her public key.  
Possession of the private key and knowledge of the passphrase used for securing it is required for that. 
1.9. Incident response procedure 
What is considered an "incident" in the first place? What happens when a security incident is discovered? What is done 
when the attacker invokes an attack? Who gets called and when? It is useful to test the procedure with a sort of incident-
response procedure drill. People to consider calling may include officers of the company, the marketing manager (for 
press relations), system and network administrative staff, and the police. When you call them, and in what order, must be 
part of the procedure. Calling too many people too soon risks letting the cat out of the bag, so to speak, or a crying wolf 
scenario. Calling too few people, too late, risks lawsuits. 
Although this process does not require any particular technical expertise, it does require a lot of thoughts. Senior 
managers should carefully take into the consideration an incident response procedure after receiving a briefing based on 
the vulnerability assessment. 
2. Current practices in European HPC centres 
There are many security-related technologies used in HPC centres. Those of the greatest importance have been presented 
in the previous chapter. The current state of implementation of the security means has been assessed basing on an 
electronic survey ran within PRACE consortium. All of the HPCs involved in the PRACE project received a list of 
questions about their security infrastructure and practices, and were asked to assess certain security aspects. The authors 
received 16reponses from European HPC sites and based this document on them. 
The details of security needs and requirements differ between centres. On the other hand, certain part of HPC centres 
activity, especially if they have the similar profile like providing services for the scientific community, will also undergo 
similar threats that can be addressed in a specific manner - optimally in the best recognized and recommended, coherent 
way in all centres. An HPC centre has to securely store its data. The data must be appropriately protected when being 
transferred to and from the centre. Suitable authorization methods in data access are necessary.  
The survey scope has been focused on the common profile of an HPC centres activity. The detailed results are not 
relevant in a public white paper since considerations specific to each site may lead to different implementations of 
security measures.. However, the survey results were used for preparing the general recommendations hereafter. 
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3. Recommendations 
This chapter presents a set of recommendations based on the experience of PRACE partners, analysis of the current state 
of the art and good security practices. We have to say here that the real level of security depends on the site requirements. 
 
Recommendation 1: Perform security audits periodically 
• Create or outsource a security department or team dealing with security issues. 
• HPC infrastructure should undergo a security test periodically, for example every 6-12 months. 
• Perform a security test of every new device or system before introducing it to the HPC infrastructure. 
• Perform a security test whenever a security breach has been detected. 
• If a new attack technique or a critical software vulnerability have been found, perform a security audit in the 
involved area. 
• Security tests should cover various scenarios: 
o Penetration tests from the Internet (white box and black box), 
o Penetration tests from the internal network (white box and black box), 
o Configuration reviews, 
o Application code review (if applications are developed), 
• All security tests should be carried out by IT security professionals who are not directly involved in 
administering the infrastructure or system being audited. 
Recommendation 2: Perform formal audits of the organization  
• Create or outsource an auditing department capable of performing formal (non-technical) security audits. 
• Create and introduce an Information Security Management System (ISMS) based on a known standard/norm 
(e.g. ISO27001), covering the whole organization. 
• Periodically, e.g. once a year, perform formal audits checking consistency with ISMS. 
Recommendation 3: Network security 
• Ensure a proper network segmentation by introducing DMZ and VLANs 
• Introduce stateful network firewalls as the main network protection means. 
• For better and deeper traffic inspection, an introduction of  application firewalls is advised. 
• Firewalls should work in the High Availability mode. 
• Consider introducing a DLP system. 
• Attack detection, mitigation and analysis: 
o Introduce network IDS or IPS, 
o Create honeypots for better understanding of attacks against the network, 
o Implement and introduce an anti-DDoS system. 
Recommendation 4: Host security 
• Introduce a local, host-based firewall on every system working in the infrastructure. 
• Install antivirus software and keep it updated. 
• If there is no network solution, it is recommended to install DLP software. 
• If there is no network solution, it is recommended to install host-based IPS/IDS. 
• Allow remote management connections only to low privilege accounts. 
Authentication should not rely only on the username and password. Introduce a higher level of security by using 2-factor 
authentication with, for example, X.509 certificates or one-time passwords. 
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4. Conclusions 
Although all of the surveyed institutions were High Performance Computing Centres, actively involved in research 
activities, they differ in many aspects, mainly due to the kind of projects they work on. This is the first reason why the 
number and quality of security means introduced to their infrastructures differ, the second reason being local 
considerations and constraints. However, it is always of interest to study whether additional measures can be 
implemented.  
One of the major differences among sites is the existence of a separate security department or team, which is highly 
recommended if possible in the context of the site. A person whose daily duties include administering the system or 
network infrastructure is never the one who should audit those systems or infrastructure. They simply cannot do it well, 
even if they possess extensive knowledge about security. The situation resembles book editing by the author– one does 
not see his or her own mistakes.  
Another important point is that security is a process, not a product. Security audits have to be performed regularly by, 
again, people not directly involved in maintaining of the infrastructure. Not all sites do perform configuration review and 
penetration tests  on a regular basis; improving this situation is highly desirable. 
Firewalls are necessary to the HPC centre’s infrastructure, as the main means of network security.   Technologies such as 
application firewalls, both network- and host-based IPS and IDS systems along with DLP software and honeypots, are 
not ubiquitous. Implementation of application firewalls and IPS/IDS systems is particularly advised. 
Another aspect of security that needs attention is the antivirus software both on desktops and servers. 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks evolve in time. New types of DDoS attacks are invented and the average volume of 
such attacks continually grows. The volume of DDoS attacks is expected to continue increasing significantly in the 
following years. The centres are highly encouraged to acknowledge this fact. 
Last but not least, a security area that is also worth considering is the Information Security Policy that should be 
formalised and updated on a regular basis, so the non-technical aspects of maintaining a decent level of security. One 
might say it is the Achilles heel of most companies or organisations, including the surveyed HPC centres. The 
Information Security Policy, if it exists, is based on internal procedures rather than known standards or norms such as, for 
example, ISO27001.  
As can be seen, High-Performance Computing Centres present different levels of security. Some of them pay more 
attention to it while others seem to be more focused on performance. Although security always comes with costs, both 
material and in the use of resources, it is highly advised to maintain at least the minimum level because performance of a 
compromised system may tend to zero. 
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Terms and abbreviations 
BHO Browser Helper Object 
DC 
DDoS 
Data Centre 
Distributed Denial of Service 
DLP Data Leak/Loss Prevention 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
DoS Denial of Service 
HA High Availability 
HPC High-Performance Computing 
IDS  Intrusion Detection System 
IPS  Intrusion Prevention System 
ISO/OSI  International Organization for Standardization/Open Systems Interconnection 
LAN  Local Area Network 
OTP  One-Time Password 
SaaS  Software as a service 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol 
SSH  Secure Shell 
UDP  User Datagram Protocol 
VLAN  Virtual LAN 
 
 
